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ENTITLED Abraham Lincoln's Plans for Reconstruction During the Civil War

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ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION DURING THE CIVIL WAR

by

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CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS

Abraham Lincoln is often remembered as a brilliant statesman with a grand plan to reunite North and South after the bitter Civil War. While Lincoln was, undoubtably, a skilled politician the question still remains--did Lincoln really have a concrete, long term reconstruction plan? In order to answer this question one must understand the goals and ideals of Lincoln during his administration and his attitude toward the South. After investigating these topics, it will be easier to see whether Lincoln ever intended to have a definite plan and, if so, whether he succeeded in meeting his goals.

Lincoln considered the issues of reconstruction from the very beginning of the war. Fundamental to his view on this subject was a belief that secession was unwarranted by the Constitution and, therefore, had never taken place. Many of Lincoln's southern policies stemmed from this basic assumption. In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln revealed his conviction that, "no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union,--that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void."[1] Assuming that the rebellious states were still in the Union, Lincoln treated the citizens of the South simply as disloyal Americans rather than enemy foreigners. Unlike many Radical Republicans, Lincoln never advocated

returning southern states to territorial status and forcing them to go through a difficult re-entry program. Lincoln's assumption that the South had remained in the Union shaped his views on Presidential power and the existence of Union loyalty in the rebel states, and intensified his commitment to finding an expedient end to the division among Americans.

It is often said that Abraham Lincoln was responsible for the expansion of the power of the President that has continued until today. Acting upon his own, without the approval of Congress on a number of occasions. Lincoln felt that the emergency situations raised by the war demanded quick, decisive action. In his message to Congress on July 4, 1861, for example, Lincoln defended his suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus while Congress was not in session. He explained that:

> Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be called together . . .[2]

Establishing his independence of Congress and his belief in the extensive power of the Presidency, Lincoln, early in his administration, laid the groundwork for his future control over reconstruction plans.

Extending his belief that the South had never seceded and was simply in a state of rebellion, Lincoln perceived much of his power in regard to the South as stemming from the Constitution. In a letter written to a group of New York

Democrats in June 1863, Lincoln once again defended his suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus and other actions such as censorship which were taker. as war measures. Lincoln wrote, "Ours is a case of Rebellion . . . and the provision of the Constitution that 'The priviledge of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public safety may require it' is the provision which especially applies to our present case."[3] Early in his Presidency, then, Lincoln established bothhis independence of Congress and his willingness to expand the provisions of the Constitution to the fullest extent. Having laid the groundwork, Lincoln felt justified in expanding the Presidential power to pardon to be a central feature of his reconstruction program.

Though he extended Presidential power to unprecedented proportions, Lincoln did not wish to accomplish the reconstruction of the South by placing Northern unionists in positions of power. Foreseeing the potential difficulties which would be involved in interfering with local politics, Lincoln declared that "there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers" among southerners in order to restore their loyal status in the Union.[4] As his reconstruction program developed, Lincoln adhered to this early statement and promoted the use of loyal unionist men to form new governments as often as possible.

President Lincoln's attitude toward the South contributed a great deal toward the way in which he decided to use his power

to restore the Union. Early in the war, Lincoln expressed his belief that most Southerners were not truly disloyal or in support of secession. They had, he felt, been deceived by a few corrupt leaders who had somehow convinced them to renounce their loyalty to the Union. In his July 4, 1861 message to Congress Lincoln described how these dishonest leaders had lured Southerners into rebellion. "Accordingly they commenced by an insidious debauching of the public mind." Lincoln theorized, "they invented an ingenious sophism which, if conceded, was followed by perfectly logical steps . . . to the complete destruction of the Union."[5] Convinced that most Southerners had been duped and, in their hearts, truly remained loyal to the Union, Lincoln went on to declare that, "It may well be questioned whether there is, to-day, a majority of legally qualified voters of any state, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe that the Union men are the minority in many if not every other one, of the so-called seceded States."[6] Lincoln's early confidence in the loyalty of a majority of southern citizens shaped the way he later developed his reconstruction plans. Believing in an underlying Unionism existing throughout the South, Lincoln was able to adopt a more forgiving attitude toward Southerners.[7]

Unlike others of his party, Lincoln did not feel a strong prejudice toward the South and had always promoted a concilliatory, compromising attitude toward the slave states. In his

campaign speech at the Cooper Institute in February, 1860, Lincoln told Republicans that, "Even though the southern people will not as much as listen to us, let us calmly consider their demands and yield to them if, in our deliberate view of our duty, we possibly can."[8] Never vehemently anti-South, Lincoln constantly tried to reassure Southerners that he was not attempting to usurp their power and that if they reconciled with the Union, their slaves would not be taken from them. He did not perceive the Southerners as evil or entirely at fault for slavery and the resulting conflict over it. Lincoln reminded Congress in 1862 that:

> The people of the South are not more responsible for the introduction of this property [slaves] than are the people of the North; and when it is remembered how unhesitatingly we all use cotton and sugar, and share the profits of dealing in them, it may not be quite safe to say, that the South has been more responsible than the North for its continuance.[9]

Willing to share the blame for slavery with the Southerners and confident in their inherent loyalty to the Union, Lincoln developed a trusting, lenient policy of reconstruction. Interested chiefly in restoring unity to the nation, Lincoln aimed not to punish the South but rather to reunite it with the North in the most expedient and efficient way possible.

At the beginning of the war, Congress and the President were in agreement over what war aims should be. In July, 1861, the Legislature adopted the Crittenden Resolution which had been developed by Kentucky's John Crittenden. The resolution established that the war was not waged "in any spirit of

oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutes of those states."[10] Lincoln endorsed the resolution which reinforced his assurances to the South that the war was not being fought in order to end slavery. When Lincoln decided to issue the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, he did so only as a last resort. The war had not been going well for the Union and Lincoln realized some drastic measures needed to be taken. In issuing the Emancipation Proclamation and forever changing the war aims, then, Lincoln aimed to help the Union end the war sooner. Contrary to his "Great Emancipator" reputation, Lincoln did not issue the proclamation because of a profound sense of duty to end slavery but, rather, because he felt it would weaken the South. "If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it," Lincoln wrote to the editor of the New York Times, Horace Greely, "and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that."[11] Lincoln's commitment to expediency in ending the war and returning the South to its previous status contributed a great deal to his willingness to be flexible in his reconstruction programs. Not rigidly adhering to any one plan, Lincoln allowed reconstruction plans to evolve through time whenever he felt a change would return the South faster. Stating his willingness to modify the restoration plan he had just announced Lincoln assured Congress that, "Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented

in a specific way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way."[12] Rather than demanding that his plan was the only one possible, the President expressed his willingness to be flexible early in the reconstruction process.

CHAPTER II

LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION OF AMNESTY AND RECONSTRUCTION

While Abraham Lincoln had been considering the problem of reconstruction since the beginning of the war, it did not become a major political issue until the fall of 1863. At that time, Union victories in vital areas of the South stirred new hope that the war would end soon and emphasized the need for a plan to restore newly captured areas to the Union. In late 1862 and early 1863, the Union continued to suffer defeat on the battlefield. Morale in the North dropped and southern restoration was only a remote theoretical topic. The summer of 1863, however, brought a major turning point in the Union cause. With July victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg and fall victories at Chattanooga and Lookout Mountain, the Union successfully consolidated its hold in southern territories and began a series of military triumphs. As a result of these northern accomplishments, the entire Mississippi River was controlled by the North, thereby cutting the Western section of the Confederacy off from that of the East. Lincoln explained the implications of the 1863 victories to Congress on December 8, 1863, "The rebel borders are pressed still further back, and by the complete opening of the Mississippi, the country dominated by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them."[1] With Arkansas, Tennessee, the

Delta region of Louisiana and some sections of Mississippi virtually cleared of rebel influences, it became practical to begin serious restoration programs in those areas.[2]

When military developments made the end of the war seem possible, Congress began to discuss the measures that would be taken toward the South, assuming the Union was victorious. A number of bills suggesting various methods of reconstruction were introduced in the fall of 1863. These bills stimulated discussion in both houses of Congress over how the South should be readmitted and what status the southern states would have after the war. As discussion over the proper method of reconstruction progressed, it became clear that the central issue involved was whether restoration of the full rights of a rebellious state should depend upon the emancipation of slaves within that state. Conservatives, consisting mainly of Democrats and some Republicans, advocated the readmission of southern states without any conditions, but especially without the abolition of slavery. The more Radical Republicans insisted that restoration of the rebel states to their full rights be contingent upon the development of new state constitutions which would emancipate slaves immediately. In the course of investigating the political aspects of the restoration issue, historian Herman Belz discovered that while most Radical Republicans agreed that emancipation should be the basis of any reconstruction plan, they offered three different theories regarding the implementation and consequences of such a plan. Massachusetts Senator

Charles Sumner was the chief spokesman for the Radical faction which supported a territorial approach toward the rebel states. In a speech published in the Atlantic Monthly in October, 1863, Sumner maintained that, "the whole rebel region, deprived of all local government, lapses under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress precisely as any territory."[3] According to Sumner and his followers, the rebel states must prove themselves worthy in order to become part of the Union again. William Whiting, the legal advisor to the War Department, took an even more extreme position on reconstruction. The rebel states, he felt, should be treated not as territories but as alien land, subject to complete Federal control. He felt that the war had obliterated all state lines in the South and that the government should eventually form new states with whatever borders it determined appropriate. The most moderate of these three Radical theories was expressed, surprisingly, by Congressman Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, who would later challenge Lincoln's restoration plan. Davis and his followers felt that the states should not be reduced to territories or treated as alien land but, rather, that they must be recognized by Congress in order to function as a state again. Expressing his views in a Philadelphia speech in September, 1863, Davis claimed that, "the States . . . [were] continuing, perpetual elements of our Union, and their citizens always beneath the Constitution."[4] During the fall of 1863, when all of these theories were emerging, it became clear that Lincoln would probably make some statement regarding restoration

in his upcoming Annual Message to Congress. Aware of the probability of a December announcement, the various factions of the Radicals and Conservatives attempted to press their opinions on President Lincoln. The plan for restoration which Lincoln did indeed announce in his annual message contained aspects of both the Radical and Conservative programs.[5]

On December 8, 1863, Abraham Lincoln issues his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction as well as his Annual Message to Congress. The latter included a detailed explanation of the proclamation and the basis upon which he assumed the power to issue it. The proclamation invited all former rebels who qualified, to sign a loyalty oath and reaffirm their allegiance to the Union.

The President based his power to issue such a broad pardon on two documents: the Constitution and Congress' Confiscation Act of July 1862. In his proclamation Lincoln explained that the Constitution of the United States provided that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment . . ."[6] Lincoln found further justification for his sweeping action in the 1862 Confiscation Act which stated that the President was "authorized at any time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing Rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare."[7]

Extending the power which the Constitution and Congress gave him, to the fullest extent, Lincoln brought reconstruction under the direction of the executive. He did, however, acknowledge that Congress had the right to deny the admission of Senators and Representatives from former rebel states to seats in the national legislature. Taking control of the restoration process, Lincoln included in his program provisions and allowances which, he felt, would expedite the reunification of the United States.

One example of Lincoln's attitude of expediency can be seen in the way he phrased the oath that southerners would be required to take. Not wanting to dwell on the past, Lincoln required only that former rebels swear their loyalty to the Union "henceforth." Explaining the lenient oath requirement in a letter to Edwin M. Stanton, Lincoln wrote, "On principle I dislike an oath which requires a man to swear he has not done wrong. It rejects the Christian principle of forgiveness on terms of repentance. I think it is enough if the man does no wrong hereafter."[8] Lincoln did, however, limit those who would be permitted to take the oath and re-enter the political realm. Excluding only officers or agents of the rebel government, those who left United States military, political or judicial positions to join the rebel cause, southern officers above the rank of Colonel in the army or lieutenant in the navy and those who had not treated blacks or whites in accordance with the rules of prisoners of war, the proclamation allowed the pardon of a great majority of former rebels.[9] Expressing his reasons for enabling

the lower ranks of the Confederate army to re-enter the Union easily and quickly, Lincoln later explained that "What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause, is not necessarily true of those who follow. Although he cannot reaccept the Union, they can."[10] Reaffirming his faith in the inherent goodness of Southerners and his desire to restore the South as quickly as possible, Lincoln required only an oath of future loyalty.

In order for a state to begin full participation in the national government, at least ten percent of those qualified to vote in the 1860 Presidential election would have to take and abide by the loyalty oath. Desiring to bring rebel states back into Congress and other political positions as quickly as possible, Lincoln required what was later considered by many to be a ridiculously low percentage of loyal citizens. From Lincoln's point of view, the ten percent figure would be a realistic starting point from which, after a pro-Union government was established, former rebel states could induce large numbers of people to renounce their rebel ties. Lincoln explained this concept in his 1863 message, "By the proclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted as a rallying point, and which they are assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they otherwise would."[11] Providing the southerners with a realistic goal would, Lincoln felt, encourage them to begin the difficult process of reunification with the Union without delay.

In his proclamation, Lincoln suggested that once at least ten percent of a state's citizens took the loyalty oath, a new republican government should be set up much as it had been prior to the war. Explaining that "It will save labor and avoid great confusion,"[12] Lincoln once again expressed his desire for an uncomplicated and expedient transition into full political participation for the former rebel states. With this provision, Lincoln reaffirmed his view that the seceded states were still in the Union and that state lines, constitutions and laws would continue virtually unchanged.

The major exception to maintaining the pre-war political framework Lincoln required was that the reunited states must abide by laws passed during the war regarding slavery. The proclamation provided ". . . that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them with restoration of all rights of property except as to slaves . . ."[13] Although Lincoln desired expediency and wished to readmit former rebels with as little bitterness as possible, he was not willing to contradict the Emancipation Proclamation which he had first issued in September 1862. Convinced of the importance of enforcing emancipation in the Southern states, Lincoln declared that, "To now abandon them [blacks] would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith."[14] While committed to the idea of emancipation, Lincoln was curiously vague about exactly how a state could go about freeing its slaves and what public services and rights were to be given to

the freed blacks. As will be discussed in more depth later, Lincoln was not adamant in forcing the restored states to abolish slavery; rather, he simply urged and encouraged it. When discussing the services which would be provided to the newly freed slaves, Lincoln was equally non-committal. In the proclamation, he wrote that any declaration of the permanent freedom for blacks and provisions for their education "will not be objected to by the national executive."[15] While upholding his policy of emancipation, Lincoln was careful not to push southerners into reform too quickly. Perhaps fearing that former rebels would not realign themselves with the Union if changes came too fast, Lincoln was weak and indirect in his instructions regarding emancipation. It was most important, Lincoln felt, to establish a working loyal government--details and provisions for freed blacks could be worked out later.

In the conclusion of the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, the President emphasized his willingness to be flexible in accepting other plans for reconstruction. "While the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest with his present impressions," he stated, "it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable."[16] Opening the door to possible modifications in the reconstruction process, Lincoln was not blindly committed to his own program but, rather desired to implement the most effective plan possible.

Because of the many conflicts in which Lincoln later became involved with the Radical faction of his party, it is

generally assumed that the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction was considered a conservative document. While, no doubt, some concilliatory aspects of the plan fit the conservative mold, Herman Belz found that Lincoln's restoration program leaned more toward the Radical position. The conservative aspect of the proclamation rests on Lincoln's belief that the states were still in the Union and his willingness to use his pardoning power to accomplish restoration. In addition, the President's conviction that states should retain the same boundaries, laws and constitutions (except with respect to slavery) agreed with the conservative position which advocated as little change from the pre-war South as possible.[17]

The Radical aspects of the proclamation, Belz discovered, were far more substantial. Lincoln's requirement that those seeking to proclaim their loyalty by taking the oath must swear to abide by all Union laws regarding slavery had a distinctly Radical tone. From the beginning of Congressional consideration of reconstruction, Radicals had agreed that the restoration of political rights should be based on adherence to Union laws forbidding slavery. The requirement that the loyalty oath be taken by all southern citizens, not simply those involved in government or military work was also Radical. It implied that all citizens of the South, not only those directly involved in the rebellion, were guilty of past disloyalty to the Union. Going against the wishes of conservatives, Lincoln did not separate loyal from disloyal southern citizens, but, simply, grouped them together.

Lincoln's provision that ten percent of the 1860 electorate had to take the loyalty oath before a new state government could be created, implied that the state governments had indeed been destroyed and, therefore, needed to be rebuilt. Although Lincoln advocated the maintenance of a pre-war framework, he would not align himself fully with the conservatives and claim that loyalist governments in the seceded states had continued to operate during the war.[18]

Because Lincoln supported a more Radical than Conservative position with his proclamation, Republicans generally favored the plan while the Democrats denounced it. Temporarily satisfied that Lincoln's plan contained their main request, that restoration be contingent upon adherence to federal laws regarding slavery, Radicals reacted positively toward the proclamation. In fact, on December 21, 1863, Radical Congressman James Ashley submitted a bill to Congress which contained many of the major provisions included in Lincoln's proclamation. The Ashley bill, as well as the chain of events leading to Radical disillusionment with Lincoln's restoration program, will be discussed later. While Republicans were basically happy with the December proclamation, Democrats denounced it, claiming that a government based on ten percent loyalty would be ruled by a minority and, therefore, would violate republican principles of government. Charging that Lincoln had formulated many aspects of his plan in order to gain support from the Radical faction of his party, Democratic leaders charged that the Proclamation was a purely political move.

The press, in the weeks following the reconstruction proclamation was full of praise for Lincoln's plan. The New York Times' Washington correspondent reported that, "No President's message since George Washington returned into private life has given such general satisfaction as that sent to Congress by Abraham Lincoln today."[19] Tired of conflict and division, the public admired Lincoln's relatively lenient restoration plan and his desire for a quick return to a unified country.

What were the political implications of Lincoln's restoration plan? To some extent, Lincoln must have been considering the coming Presidential election in 1864 and the support he would need to win both nomination and election. Richard Abbot has found that, "Although Lincoln was more concerned with organizing loyal governments in the South that would abolish slavery than with building Republican parties there, the men he helped install in power under his Reconstruction plan rallied to his political support."[20] Although not his central objective, the Presidential support which was cultivated in the restored states could not help but benefit Lincoln politically. Lincoln's careful inclusion of both Radical and Conservative policies in his proclamation can also be viewed as political. Desiring the broadest base of support possible for his plan, Lincoln carefully included aspects of both programs in his plan, thereby avoiding specific requirements which would have offended either faction.

His proclamation issued, Lincoln could undertake formal restoration programs in Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana, where

an unofficial plan had been in operation for months. With military conditions favorable, political support intact and the public supporting him, Lincoln moved to implement his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction.

CHAPTER III

IMPLEMENTATION OF LINCOLN'S PLAN

The actual implementation of the Presidential plan of reconstruction met with a number of difficulties and setbacks. Before the official proclamation was announced in December 1863, Lincoln had taken steps whenever possible to encourage the restoration of rebel states to the Union. Louisiana, Tennessee and Arkansas received special attention both before and after his December speech. Military governors had been appointed in each of these states prior to the amnesty proclamation and Lincoln strongly encouraged holding elections as quickly as possible. Confident that the successful reconstruction of one southern state would bring others back into the Union more rapidly, Lincoln undertook the task of overseeing the progress of restoration in each of these states. Following a policy of minimal interference in order to promote expediency, Lincoln allowed his governors to direct operations as they saw fit and merely suggested and encouraged election dates and constitutional conventions. Despite the President's support, the three states encountered a number of political and military difficulties which only served to delay the reconstruction process.

As the first state to begin reconstruction under the direction of President Lincoln in 1862, Louisiana was regarded

as the testing ground for Presidential reconstruction. Early in the war, the southern portion of the state, particularly the port of New Orleans, fell into Union hands. Having avoided much of the military destruction present elsewhere in the South and reflecting the pro-Unionist sentiment of the New Orleans business community, Louisiana appeared to be in an ideal position for restoration. Although he was quite flexible in the actual implementation of his plan, President Lincoln, early in the restoration process in Louisiana, insisted that certain guidelines be followed. These guidelines would later be applied to Tennessee and Arkansas as well. Declaring that "carpetbaggism" would not promote the true restoration of a state, Lincoln wrote, "To send a parcel of Northern men . . . would be disgusting and outrageous."[1] Not only should officials be natives of the restored state whenever possible, Lincoln felt, but the elections held to vote them into office should also not be forced militarily. Rather, they should be truly desired by the public. Beyond these two principles, Lincoln tried to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of the state. In a letter to Louisiana military governor, Nathaniel P. Banks, Lincoln stated that "While I very well know what I would be glad for Louisiana to do, it is quite a different thing to assume direction of the matter."[2] With Louisiana's restoration, the President established a procedure which he would later insist upon in Tennessee and Arkansas.

As the first step in the restoration of Louisiana, Lincoln appointed a staunchly anti-slavery man, George F.

Shepley, to be military governor in June 1862. Shepley's ally, General Benjamin F. Butler, was commander of the Union forces which had occupied southern Louisiana. Called "Beast Butler" because of his declaration that all southern women walking the streets at night were to be arrested as prostitutes, Butler promoted feelings of animosity toward the Union. Constantly antagonizing and alienating the citizens of the state, General Butler did nothing to promote reconstruction. Realizing that Butler was undermining the reconstruction cause, Lincoln uncharacteristically intervened and sent the General to serve elsewhere. General Nathaniel P. Banks was soon chosen to replace Butler.[3]

Meanwhile, two factions in Louisiana were struggling to gain control of the process to return Louisiana to a loyal Unionist state. These factions each formed a committee which would represent their views in political circles. One, the Executive Central Committee, consisted of conservative, pro-slavery planters. This group advocated restoring the old state constitution which protected slavery. They felt that the Emancipation Proclamation was only a war measure and that slavery would probably be restored after the war. In contrast, their rivals who formed the Free State General Committee were strongly anti-slavery and wanted to develop a new state constitution which expressly prohibited slavery. Governor Shepley, because of his Radical beliefs, was sympathetic to the free state cause and assigned his Attorney General,

Thomas J. Durant, the task of collecting a registry of loyal citizens with the object of soon holding a constitutional convention. Encouraged by the prospect of a new anti-slavery constitution and, eventually, elections which would complete the restoration process, Lincoln, in June 1863, endorsed the work of the Free State Committee. Replying to a request from the Executive State Committee for support, Lincoln declared his loyalty to the Free State Committee by stating that he would not endorse the present Louisiana constitution.[4]

During the Shepley administration, while work towards a constitutional convention was just beginning, another encouraging development occurred. In December 1862, an election had been held in the state to choose two members for United States Congress. Benjamin Flanders, originally of New Hampshire, and Michael Hahn, a long time Louisiana citizen, were the Representatives chosen. Both were members of the Free State Committee and were staunch anti-slavery men. To the surprise of many, the Congressional Committee on Elections reported in favor of seating Hahn and Flanders because more than half of those who had voted in the 1859 elections had participated. The results, therefore, were considered legitimate. All state election laws, the committee felt, had been followed with the exception that Shepley was a military rather than regularly elected governor. Members of the House opposed to the seating claimed that Lincoln had controlled the Congressional elections through military force and that a

military governor, authorized only to preserve the peace, had no power to call for elections. The committee's recommendation, however, had a great deal of influence and to the delight of Louisiana citizens, Hahn and Flanders were admitted to Congress by a vote of 92 to 44 on February 17, 1863. The admission of the Louisiana Representatives was a great victory for the Lincoln administration in that it endorsed the steps the President had taken toward restoration in the state. Perhaps it was the successful admission of the Louisiana Representatives into Congress that gave Lincoln the confidence to announce his plan in December 1863. Seeing the Congressional endorsement of the Louisiana plan, Lincoln optimistically assumed that a new anti-slavery constitution would follow in the state, as well as in states such as Tennessee and Arkansas where restoration attempts were just beginning.[5]

When Nathaniel Banks replaced General Butler in early 1863, conflicts immediately arose between Banks and Shepley. Shepley was a Radical who wanted the Free State committee to control the politics of the state, thwarting the historical power of the planters, and to create a new state constitution quickly. Banks, however, wished to make conciliatory gestures toward the enemies of the Shepley government in order to broaden the Unionist base of support. He did not want to alienate the conservatives in the state by a hasty movement toward a new constitution. The lack of agreement between the two Louisiana leaders as well as an absence of popular support for a

constitutional convention caused a delay in the registration of loyal citizens. Lincoln, who had been so pleased with the Congressional developments in February and was about to announce his official restoration plan, wrote to Banks in November 1863 that the failure to continue working toward a convention "disappoints me bitterly."[6] Realizing that political disputes within the state could destroy what little had already been done towards reconstruction, Lincoln decided in December 1863 to proclaim Banks as the supreme authority in Louisiana. "I have all the while intended you to be master," Lincoln wrote Banks. "Governor Shepley was appointed to assist the Commander of the Department and not to thwart him, or act independently of him."[7] The balance of power established, General Banks effectively took over the restoration movement in Louisiana.

Having gained political control, Banks completely rejected the Free State Committee plan of holding a constitutional convention and then electing state officials under a new anti-slavery constitution. Banks simply called an election for seven state executive officers to be held on February 22, 1864, before a new constitution could be drawn up. Planning to issue military decrees nullifying the pro-slavery sections of the existing state constitution, Banks felt that a new document was not needed in order to hold a legitimate election. Explaining to Lincoln that an immediate election was "the only speedy and certain method of accomplishing your object,"[8] General Banks declared that putting the slavery question to a

vote would be a risk and that simply negating slavery through military decrees was a safer course.[9]

Banks promised that a constitutional convention would be formed soon after the elections. Lincoln, although he would have preferred an explicitly anti-slavery state constitution, reacted positively toward Banks' plan. "Your confidence in the practibility of constructing a free state government, speedily for Louisiana," Lincoln wrote to Banks, "and your zeal to accomplish it, are very gratifying."[10] Desiring the expedient restoration of Louisiana, Lincoln was willing to allow a new constitution to be formed later. Members of the Free State Committee, however, were furious that the control of restoration had been taken from them. Free State Committee leader T. J. Durant protested to Lincoln that the committee was "deeply mortified" when the President "took the whole question of civil reorganization out of our hands and gave it to the exclusive control of the military."[11] Protest over Lincoln's acceptance of the Louisiana elections without a new constitution soon developed in Congress. Radicals such as Henry Winter Davis of Maryland and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania inflamed the Louisiana election question into a major political issue. The consequences will be discussed later.

Michael Hahn, one of the Representatives who had been admitted to Congress in early 1863, was elected governor as a result of the controversial elections. He and Banks saw to it that an election for convention delegates was held, as promised,

on March 28, 1864. The convention met from April to July and, in its new constitution, abolished slavery and established some provision for the suffrage of blacks. On September 5, an election for two new Louisiana congressmen was held. The restoration of Louisiana was thus complete for the state had fulfilled all of the provisions established in Lincoln's Amnesty and Reconstruction Proclamation. One major problem still existed. Congress refused to seat the newly elected Congressmen so Louisiana could not be represented on the national level. This lack of representation meant that the state could not be considered entirely restored to its pre-war status.[12]

The story of Tennessee's reconstruction is one filled with military setbacks which slowed the process considerably. When Abraham Lincoln appointed Andrew Johnson to the post of military Governor on March 3, 1862, he had reason for optimism about the possibilities of restoring Tennessee. General Ulysses S. Grant pushed the rebel army across the Tennessee River and freed the western portion of the state of Confederate control. Johnson was instructed "to reestablish the authority of the Federal government" in the state and to "provide the means of maintaining peace and security in the loyal inhabitants of the state until they shall be able to establish a civil government."[13] While these instructions were vague, Lincoln later offered a more concrete piece of advice, "Get emancipation into your new State government Constitution and there will be no such word as fail in your case."[14] Johnson was fully

committed to this objective because, although he was a Democrat, he was strongly anti-slavery and had opposed the secession of Tennessee vehemently.[15]

Once again, as in Louisiana, Lincoln left the actual implementation of the plan to the officials in the state. "You, and the cooperating friends there," Lincoln informed Johnson, "can better judge of the ways and means, than can be judged by any here."[16] Armed with vague instructions and a deep conviction to rid his state of slavery, Andrew Johnson set out to restore his state to the Union.

Johnson's unwavering opposition to the evils of slavery and his refusal to leave his United States Senate seat when Tennessee seceded all served to make him extremely unpopular among Democrats. This unpopularity was to be expected. His difficulties with the Unionists in the state, however, proved to make Johnson's task of restoration quite difficult. A long time adversary of William G. Brownlow, the leader of the Tennessee Unionist party, Johnson began his campaign to gather loyal unionists at a disadvantage. To aggravate the situation further, Johnson adopted policies with which many unionists, including Brownlow, disagreed. Johnson decided that, in order to eliminate the secessionist influence in the state, he would remove or silence anti-Union leaders. In an extremely unpopular move, Johnson ordered seven prominent Nashville leaders (six of whom were ministers) who had refused to take a loyalty oath to be exiled in rebel-held territory. Johnson also ordered a

number of Nashville newspapers such as the Daily Times and The Banner to submit to censorship in April 1862, only a month after he had been appointed. The Gazette and The Patriot, secessionist papers, were forced to stop publication entirely. All of these harsh measures contributed to deteriorate Johnson's already weak base of support. Johnson, in time, became so unpopular that he constantly received threatening letters and plots to assassinate him were numerous.[17]

While Johnson's lack of political support in Tennessee slowed restoration, the fluctuating military situation in the state was also detrimental to the process. Lincoln's optimism when he appointed Johnson was short lived for less than a month later, the Confederates once again entered middle Tennessee. The announcement of Lincoln's Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, on September 22, 1862, however, inspired reconstruction activity in the state despite the uncertain military situation. Promising a less harsh slavery policy for those states which complied, the proclamation made citizens in the state eager to demonstrate their loyalist feelings. Mass meetings, encouraged by Governor Johnson, were held around the state to stimulate Union support. Johnson decided that enough support had been indicated by Tennessee citizens in these rallies to hold an election for two members of Congress on December 29, 1862. These elections, however, were a complete disaster. Confederate General Nathan B. Forrest invaded the voting district on election day and the polling place site

became a battleground. Obviously, a sufficient voter turnout was not possible and no one was elected.[18]

After almost a year of little reconstruction progress, prospects once again looked good in September 1863 when Confederate forces evacuated Chattanooga. President Lincoln considered this an ideal opportunity to move ahead with reconstruction and informed Johnson that, "You need not be reminded that it [the Chattanooga victory] is in the nick of time for re-inaugurating a loyal state government. Not a moment should be lost."[18] Giving Johnson the authority to exercise all powers necessary for restoring the state, Lincoln encouraged him once again to hold mass meetings and to attempt another election.

Following the Battle of Chattanooga in November 1863, Tennessee was cleared of Rebel soldiers. With President Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction providing explicit guidelines, Johnson called for a Congressional election to be held March 5, 1864. The election could not be considered valid, however, because confusion, disorganization and lack of public interest resulted in a voter turnout lower than Lincoln's required ten percent of the 1860 registered voters. His unpopularity still strong in the state, Johnson was unable to rally voters to support the restoration cause.[19]

Later in 1864, the East Tennessee Union Executive Committee, consisting of Brownlow and his followers, called for a constitutional convention to be held on January 9, 1865. The convention adopted an amendment to the old state constitution

which abolished slavery and called for an election for governor and the General Assembly to be held February 22. When more than ten percent of the 1860 electorate took the loyalty oath and participated in the election, the amendments were ratified by a 25,293 to 48 margin. William G. Brownlow was elected Governor. Once again, a southern state had completed the provisions established in Abraham Lincoln's reconstruction plan. The acceptance of Tennessee Representatives into Congress, however, was not achieved so Tennessee, like Louisiana, was left in a precarious political situation.[20]

Once it began in earnest in 1863, the restoration of Arkansas progressed with far fewer difficulties than were encountered in either Louisiana or Tennessee. Military and political problems did not hinder the reconstruction process and a great public demand for a restored state government helped to speed the progress of restoration. Reluctant at first to secede, Arkansas had not withdrawn from the Union until after the fall of Fort Sumter. Many citizens in the state retained their unionist loyalties throughout the war. Initial efforts, however, to appoint a military governor and move toward the development of a loyal state government were not entirely successful. After an early summer campaign in which the Union had captured Helena, Lincoln seized the opportunity to appoint a military governor in Arkansas. Hoping that the Union holdings would soon be expanded and solidified, Lincoln appointed General John S. Phelps of Missouri to oversee the military in the state

and what he hoped would be a movement toward reconstruction. Lincoln's expectations, however, were not met. Uncertain Union military security and a long illness which befell General Phelps both contributed to a lack of pro-Union activity in the state. Within a year, Lincoln, disillusioned by the lack of movement, revoked Phelps' military commission. The President decided that Arkansas was not ready to be restored and, therefore, did not yet require a military governor.[21]

During 1863, however, a number of Union military victories made Lincoln anxious to attempt restoration again. By July, all territory north and east of the Arkansas River had been cleared of Confederate troops. This significant Union bulwark was expanded when General Frederick Steele successfully led Union troops in the Helena-Little Rock expedition. On September 10 1863, Little Rock fell into Union hands and more than half of Arkansas was under Federal control. Lincoln decided to appoint General Steele to the military governorship soon after his brilliant Little Rock campaign. Lincoln wrote to Steele that he was to be "master" of the reorganization process. Perhaps attempting to avoid political power struggles which had developed earlier in Louisiana, Lincoln made it clear that Steele alone was in charge of Arkansas' restoration.[22]

The Military Governor's task of gathering loyal unionists was made easy because for months the public had been rallying to the unionist cause. Self-appointed leaders E. W. Gantt and William Fishback, both ex-Confederates, enthusiastically

organized a number of mass meetings throughout the Union territory in the state. These meetings were not only popular but were also endorsed by Steele. The National Democrat, a popular Arkansas paper, reported that one such meeting held on December 31, 1863, in Little Rock was attended by more than 3,000 people, an impressive showing considering the number of citizens who were away fighting in the war.[23] Thomas S. Staples, an Arkansas reconstruction historian, found that, "A majority of the local mass meetings had resolved for immediate emancipation."[24] With Union and emancipation sentiment strong in the state, Gantt, Fishback and their followers became the chief instigators in the call for a constitutional convention to be held in January, a move that greatly pleased both Lincoln and Steele. On January 5, 1864, Lincoln officially offered Arkansas residents the opportunity to take the loyalty oath and thus to begin the process of reorganizing the state government.[25]

The convention met in early January 1864. After disputes over the admission of some delegates were settled and convention rules were established, the delegates began revising the old state constitution. The new document forbade slavery but did not go so far as to provide suffrage for the freed men. The convention also established a provisional government consisting of a governor, lieutenant governor and secretary of state which would remain in power until regular elections could be held. Isaac Murphy, an unwavering unionist who had denounced secession throughout the early 1860s, was chosen provisional governor.

The vote to ratify the new constitution and elect permanent state officers was scheduled for March 13, 1864. Steele, once again supporting Gantt, Fishback and their constituents, gave the new constitution and proposed election his endorsement. In late February Steele addressed the people and encouraged them to support the new Constitution which was "based upon the principles of freedom."[26] The President, also, was pleased with the adherence to his call for a free state constitution.[27]

In the weeks leading up to election day, Harris Flanigan, Governor of the Confederate state government in Arkansas, realized the threat the election posed to the continuance of rebel influence in Arkansas. Attempting to discourage voters from going to the polls, Flanigan instructed Confederate sympathizers and soldiers in the area to do everything possible to interfere with the election process, including the use of violent threats and guerilla tactics. Despite this alarming activity, however, Union support ran strong and a higher number than expected arrived at the polls to vote. "The people have been enthusiastic," provisional governor Murphy telegraphed Lincoln, and were, "voting in immense risk of loss of life and property, the guerillas having threatened to hang everyone, that went to the polls."[28] According to Lincoln's ten percent provision, 5,406 votes were needed in order to validate the election. Far surpassing the requirement, 12,177 out of 12,403 total voters chose to ratify the new constitution and elect Isaac Murphy as permanent governor. While some claims of voting

irregularities arose from the ors of The National Democrat and The Washington Telegraph, the results were accepted as legitimate in view of the impressive voter turnout. Lincoln further confirmed the validity of the results in a letter to the newly-elected governor, "I am much gratified to learn that you got out such a large vote, so nearly all the right way, at the late election."[29] Generally satisfied with the methods used to conduct the election, Lincoln was impressed by the efficiency and expediency with which General Steele and the citizens of Arkansas had restored their government.[30]

When the new government was inaugurated on April 18, 1864, in Little Rock, one major stumbling block remained--that of the Congressional acceptance of Arkansas Senators and Representatives. The new legislature chose William Fishback, an ex-confederate and important leader in rallying unionist support in the state, and Elisha Baxter, a respected man who, like Murphy, had an unblemished record of Union loyalty, to the Senate. Congress, however, refused to even review the credentials of the Arkansas delegation so, as in Louisiana and Tennessee, Congressional representation was denied a state which had fulfilled all of the requirements for restoration specified in Lincoln's plan. The President was bitterly disappointed that the Arkansas restoration program which had progressed so satisfactorily should end in such a manner. He refused, however, to abandon the loyal government in the state and instructed Steele in June 1964 to, "give that government

and the people there, the same support and protection that you would if the members had been admitted [to Congress]."[31]

Although Arkansas' reconstruction ended in Congressional disappointment, the progress towards reconstruction in the state was more efficiently conducted than in Louisiana or Tennessee. In most respects, the Arkansas restoration was a model example of how Lincoln's plan would work. A military governor was appointed, unionist sentiment gathered, oaths taken and a new, free state constitution was ratified prior to the establishment of a permanent loyal state government. Not plagued by the military setbacks experienced by Tennessee or the political conflicts present in both Louisiana and Tennessee, Arkansas and her citizens were able to carry out the President's plan without delay or conflict.

CHAPTER IV

CONGRESSIONAL REACTION, PART I

Amidst the complications of implementing his plan in Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee, Lincoln had to face another source of frustration--Congressional opposition. While original reaction to his proclamation had been positive and a Congressional bill modeled after his plan was introduced into the House in late December 1863, relations between Congress and Lincoln deteriorated quickly. Various political motivations and expressions of disapproval of the President's actions in Louisiana led many former pro-administration Congressmen to change their allegiances. Conditions became perfect for Radical sentiment to dominate Congressional actions.

As discussed earlier, public and press reaction to Lincoln's proclamation was quite positive. Politically, the proclamation was well received by members of Lincoln's party while Democrats denounced the plan as a political move which did not promote a republican form of government. The surprisingly broad support of the Republican party greatly enhanced the plan's chances for success and for a short time newspapers and Congressmen themselves expressed optimism for the future of Lincoln's plan. "The President seems to have made friends among the Radicals and Conservatives with his new plan of Reconstruction," the editor of the Springfield, Massachusetts Weekly

Republican wrote, "Henceforth the Republican party is a unit, and no quarrels between Radicals and Conservatives will be in order."[1] Reflecting a similar opinion, John Forney, secretary of the Senate and publisher of the Philadelphia Press remarked in his paper that he had never witnessed "a more cordial and enthusiastic unity in any party."[2]

The key to this new unity among Republicans was that even those members of the party that had in the past opposed many of Lincoln's policies were satisfied with the December proclamation. Because it required each citizen to pledge to uphold laws made regarding slavery and it strongly suggested that new anti-slavery constitutions be created before elections were held, the proclamation was well received by many members of Congress who were staunch anti-slavery advocates. John Hay, Lincoln's secretary, wrote that even such Radicals as Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and Owen Lovejoy of Illinois were happy with the President's plan. Massachusetts radical, George Boutwell, Hay wrote, described the proclamation, "It is a very able and shrewd paper. It has great points of popularity and it is right."[3] Another Radical, James Ashley of Ohio, was so convinced of the correctness of thePresidential plan that he introduced a bill to implement most of its main provisions.

Ashley who had earlier been a leading advocate of the territorialization of rebel states as a reconstruction measure, had modified his opinion by December 1863. Now considering the rebellious states to have retained an existence within the Union,

Ashley felt that many of Lincoln's restoration provisions were wise. His support was indicative of a changing attitude in Congress which seemed to be moving toward a more moderate and conciliatory view of the South and its reconstruction. Although many reconstruction bills were introduced into the two houses of Congress following the President's proclamation, Ashley's was considered the most important because of the Congressman's prestige and drastic shift in opinion which the bill represented.

In introducing his bill to the House on December 21, 1863, Ashley argued that it was Congress' duty to guarantee a republican form of government to each state. In the preamble of his bill he explained that, "it is obligatory upon Congress after the rebellious States have been reduced to obedience and the citizens thereof are willing to establish state governments under the Constitution, to provide by law for eliciting the will of the loyal people of said states."[4] Having established Congressional authority to direct the reconstruction of the rebel states, Ashley provided specific instructions for them to follow. Whenever a district in any rebel state came under the control of the Union, a military governor would be appointed for that state. Reconstruction would begin in earnest when the people in the state "signified to the Governor a desire to return to their obedience to the Constitution."[5] While Lincoln's proclamation did not explicitly call for the appointment of a military governor, Lincoln obviously agreed with Ashley's

provision for he had, previous to his proclamation, made such appointments in the three states in which his reconstruction program was implemented.

When public desire to form a loyal state government was made known, the enrollment of loyal male citizens over the age of twenty-one would begin; when the number enrolled reached a figure greater than ten percent of those eligible to vote in the 1860 election of the state, a constitutional convention could be called by the military governor. Once again, Ashley's bill directly reflected a major Presidential policy by adopting the ten percent provision. Reflecting a conciliatory attitude toward the South and a desire to end the division of the country quickly, Ashley's bill required the same oath provided in Lincoln's proclamation.

Rather than merely encouraging the development of a new anti-slavery constitution as Lincoln's plan had, Ashley's bill expressly required it. The bill provided that the new state constitution should be "Republican and not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the President's proclamation of January 1, 1863 [the Emancipation Proclamation]."[6] More explicit in its instructions than Lincoln's proclamation, the bill stated that the freedom of blacks must be guaranteed and protected in the new document. If the Constitution met these requirements and was ratified by the loyal registered voters of the state, the President would declare the new government to be loyal and returned to the Union. Senators and Congressmen would

then be elected under the new constitution, to be "entitled to appear" in Congress. If the constitution did not fulfill the requirements specified in the Ashley bill, the state would remain under military governorship until a proper constitution was ratified.

While the Ashley bill reflected many of the provisions present in Lincoln's plan, such as the specific steps towards restoration and the requirement of a new constitution, a few significant differences existed which indicate that Ashley's Radical ideals had not been entirely modified. These differences were mainly in the rules for elections in the states undergoing reconstruction. While Lincoln, in the interest of expediency, had declared that elections could be held under existing state election laws, Ashley provided simply that all males over twenty-one who qualified as loyal could vote. The difference was that every former rebel state, if it kept its old election laws, would prohibit blacks from voting. Ashley's general requirement of males over twenty-one would, naturally, include blacks. A further difference in the voting provisions was that the Ashley bill eliminated many more former rebels from taking the loyalty oath than did the Presidential plan. Lincoln, when considering the military, had excluded only officers above the rank of Colonel in the Army or Lieutenant in the Navy. Ashley, in contrast, excluded "all persons who have voluntarily borne arms against the United States, or held any office Civil or Military."[7] Ashley's bill, therefore, significantly reduced the

number of citizens who could take the loyalty oath, thus making it more difficult to reach the ten percent figure. The reconstruction process would, inevitably, be slowed. The true effects of the Ashley bill, however, will never be known. Although the bill seemed to be gathering support from a unified pro-administration feeling in the Republican party, the attitude of Congress soon changed. The bill was never passed.[8]

As early as January 1864, rumblings of discontent within the Republican party were apparent. Whitelaw Reid, editor of the Cincinnati Gazette, reported that while the first reaction to Lincoln's proclamation had been positive, "as they [Congressmen] began to scan it more closely the radical wing of the administration party became more cautious in their praise."[9] Radicals occasionally complained that the proclamation did not go far enough to guarantee the rights of blacks and that it was too lenient towards former Rebels. One point of dissatisfaction was the absence of a time limit on the offer of amnesty. Maine Republican William Pitt Fessenden expressed his disapproval in a letter to his wife, "Think of telling the Rebels they may fight as long as they can, and take a pardon when they have had enough of it."[10] Those complaints, however, did not represent an organized movement against Lincoln and were expressed only in isolated incidents. It was not until Lincoln proceeded with Louisiana's reconstruction in a manner with which many Republicans disagreed that a genuine anti-administration movement arose.

As discussed earlier, when the President recognized political conflicts in Louisiana between Military Governor Shepley

and General Nathaniel Banks in December 1863, he declared Banks to be "master" of the restoration process in the state. Banks decided that it would be wise first to hold an election for loyal state officers and then form a constitutional convention. Not wanting to risk having an anti-slavery constitution voted down by the people, Banks would simply hold elections under the old constitution with all slavery provisions in it made null and void by military decree. Although Lincoln undoubtably would have preferred to have the new constitution ratified before elections took place, he consented to Bank's plan in the interest of expediency. Concerned with setting up a loyal state government as quickly as possible, Lincoln was willing to be flexible in the order of steps towards a restored government.

As promised by Banks, a constitutional convention was held in late March, one month after the elections, and the document was ratified in September 1864. Radicals in Congress, however, were not willing to be as flexible as the President. In January, when Lincoln approved Banks' intention to hold an election before a new state constitution was developed, members of Congress reacted with anger. Maryland Congressman Henry Winter Davis expressed the opinion of many Radicals, "There is no loyal authority to hold any election in the State of Louisiana; any attempt to hold an election by any body of persons is a usurpation of sovereign authority against the United States."[11] The main reason Radicals had originally accepted the Presidential plan was their belief that, following Lincoln's urging, states

would adopt an anti-slavery constitution before taking any other actions toward reconstruction. Feeling betrayed by Lincoln's actions in Louisiana, Radicals began to criticize almost every aspect of his plan, soon deciding to develop a reconstruction program of their own.

In order to condemn the developments in Louisiana and to avoid such actions in the future, an influential congressman from Pennsylvania, Thaddeus Stevens, proposed a bill in January 1864. The preamble of the bill declared that "No portion of said territory shall be readmitted into the Union as a State, or be represented in its Congress . . . until the people within the territory forming such State, shall, by its organic law, forever prohibit slavery."[12] Referring to Rebel states as territories, Stevens revealed that the radical opinion was once again moving toward territorialization and harsh reconstruction requirements.

As criticism toward the Presidential plan and, therefore, Ashley's bill mounted, protests over the ten percent requirement began to surface. Ohio Senator Benjamin F. Wade, who chaired the Senate Committee on Reconstruction, declared that the provision violated "American principles" and that "until majorities can be found loyal and trustworthy for state government, they must be governed by a stronger hand."[13] Protesting that only ten percent of the voting population did not represent a democratic majority, radicals found yet another flaw in Lincoln's plan.

The content of the plan itself was not the only source of dissatisfaction. Many felt that Congress alone had the

jurisdiction to decide if a state had been legitimately restored and that, consequently, Congress should set up the requirements which would have to be met. Basing their reconstruction powers on the section of the constitution that Ashley used in the preamble of his bill, stating that Congress had the duty to guarantee a republican form of government to every state, many Radicals felt the President must follow a restoration plan developed by Congress. Rather than using this constitutional provision as a reason to work with the President as Ashley had, the Radicals now thought it justification to exclude the President entirely from the restoration process.[14]

As dissatisfaction with Lincoln's restoration program surged through Congress, Radicals decided to take advantage of the anti-administration sentiment. The specific points of Lincoln's program and a desire for Congressional control over reconstruction were not the only issues involved in the desire of Radicals to discredit the President. Many had decided that Lincoln should not have another term as President, preferring Salmon P. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, for the office. With the election coming up in November, Radicals began in late January to emphasize the many flaws in the President's restoration policies, thereby reducing, they hoped, his chances of receiving the Republican nomination in July.

One Radical, Henry Winter Davis, had not only political but personal differences with Lincoln. Herman Belz had discovered that in January 1864 Lincoln refused Davis' request for

help in a Maryland Congressional election that pitted Davis against Montgomery Blair. Although Davis kept his seat after a tough election battle, he held a continuing grudge against Lincoln. It was shortly after the Maryland election that Davis began to denounce Lincoln's actions in Louisiana. As sentiment against Lincoln and his actions grew, Davis realized that the perfect opportunity to reduce Lincoln's power over reconstruction had presented itself. On February 15, 1864, Davis introduced a reconstruction bill which, while similar in a few aspects to Lincoln's plan, was a direct challenge to many of the basic principles the President had offered in the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction.[15]

CHAPTER V

CONGRESSIONAL REACTION, PART II

In early 1864, Abraham Lincoln's political prospects appeared grim. His actions in Louisiana had drawn criticism from many Republicans and the Presidential election was not far off. While his political base appeared to be slowly crumbling, the President's public support also waned. The war seemed to be at a stalemate; there had been no significant Union victories to bolster the public's spirit since the year before. Amidst these discouraging developments, Lincoln had to face another significant challenge--the Wade-Davis bill. The bill was Congress' response to Lincoln's reconstruction plan and the first stage in what would prove to be a long and bitter confrontation between the executive and the Congress.

Henry Winter Davis, chairman of the newly formed House Select Committee on the Rebellious States, was prepared to introduce a reconstruction bill as early as the end of January 1864 but he was unable to get authorization to print and introduce the bill until February 15. While the bill had more radical intentions than that earlier introduced by James Ashley, many of the same arguments were used by Davis to establish Congressional power over the restoration process. Like Ashley, Davis relied on the fourth section of Article IV of the Constitution which charged Congress with the duty to ensure a republican form of

government in each state. Unlike Ashley, however, Davis used the clause to expand the powers of Congress in the area of reconstruction. Where Ashley had argued that both Congress and the President should play a joint role in reconstruction process, Davis interpreted the clause as excluding the President entirely from the process. In his speech to the House of Representatives supporting the bill, Davis explained that a precedent giving Congress the exclusive power to determine the status of a state government had already been set. Referring to an 1849 Rhode Island case, Luther vs. Borden, Davis claimed that Chief Justice Taney in his decision had established that "it is the exclusive perogative of Congress, and not of the President--to determine what is and what is not the established government of the state . . ."[1] Extending the Supreme Court decision to the current reconstruction question, Davis and his committee set out to establish Congressional guidelines for the restoration of a state which excluded policies President Lincoln had already established.

The procedure a state would be required to follow in order to be declared a republican and loyal government was similar in some ways to Ashley's bill. The most important similarity was that Davis' bill required a former rebel state to draft a new anti-slavery constitution before elections or other activities of a normal government would begin. Following the Radical position that reconstruction should be contingent upon the emancipation of slaves, Davis' bill expressly required

the new state constitution to guarantee freedom for blacks in order for it to be considered valid by Congress.[2]

The anti-slavery constitution would be developed and voted on under the direction of a provisional governor. Unlike Lincoln and Ashley's plans, however, this governor did not necessarily have to be a part of the military. The appointed governor would not begin steps toward restoring the state until all armed resistance to Union forces in the state was completely eliminated. This provision could easily mean that reconstruction in many states would not begin until the war was over. As will become clear, Davis and many other Radicals thought this delay wise. Davis declared that there should be an intermediate period "in which sound legislative wisdom requires that the authority of Congress should take possession of . . . those states now in rebellion until peace can be restored and republican government can be established deliberately, undisturbed by the . . . fear of arms."[3] Only after all armed resistence was "trampled into the dust" could a provisional governor begin to direct the registration of loyal citizens with the aim of electing delegates to a constitutional convention.

To be eligible to enroll as a loyal citizen, Davis' bill declared, men would be required to take a loyalty oath. This oath, however, was drastically different from that provided in Lincoln's December 1863 amnesty proclamation. Not only requiring future loyalty to the Union, the oath required past loyalty as well. First instigated in 1862 as the oath required for all who

wished to hold federal office, this "iron-clad" oath forced the taker to swear he had never borne arms against the United States nor aided the rebellion.[4] Obviously, a majority of citizens in any former rebel state would have participated in the rebellion in some aspect and, therefore, would be unable to take the oath. The purpose of the "iron-clad" oath was to gain time for the Radicals to solidify their control over reconstruction before the process was implemented throughout the South. Knowing the requirement of past loyalty would greatly slow progress toward establishing a loyal government in any southern state, the Radicals wanted to delay reconstruction until after the war.

Those eligible to take the oath, the bill provided, would be "all white male citizens of the United States resident in the state in their respective counties."[5] It is surprising that Davis included the racial qualification in his bill. Radicals at the time were not only staunchly anti-slavery but also generally advocated black suffrage. This qualification, however, does not seem to have promoted controversy because no mention of this section of the bill was made during the lengthy discussions in either the House or the Senate.

Once a sufficient number of loyal males were registered, the provisional governor could order a constitutional convention to be elected. At this convention three basic provisions must be written into the new constitution: that slavery be expressly prohibited; that the confederate debt be formally repudiated; and that those who had held civil or military positions in either the

rebellious state or the Confederacy be prohibited from running for the legislature or the governorship. Once these three provisions were met, the Constitution would be put to the voters for ratification. If the voters approved the new document, the President could, after the approval of Congress, declare the state to be loyal. Ensuring Congressional control, Davis made it a point to give the national legislature the final decision on whether a state had taken sufficient steps toward restoration.[6]

On the day the bill was to be brought up for a vote in the House, May 4, 1864, Davis reported two amendments from his committee. In the original version of the bill which had been printed and formally introduced on February 15, only 10% of the 1860 electorate, the figure Lincoln had adopted, were required to take the loyalty oath. If this provision had remained in the final version of the bill, early restoration, despite the iron-clad oath, could have been possible. The amendment, however, drastically raised the requirement from ten percent to a majority. Arguing that "One tenth cannot control nine tenths,"[7] Davis appeared to have changed his mind sometime between mid-January and early May.

When the bill was first developed, reaction to Lincoln's plan, including the ten percent provision, was still relatively positive. It was not until the middle of February that prominent Radicals such as Benjamin F. Wade and Thaddeus Stevens began to complain that the lack of a majority government in the restored

states would violate democratic principles. Perhaps detecting the drift of Congressional opinion away from the Presidential plan, Davis and his committee thought it wise to announce the new requirement before the vote was taken. Not only did the fifty percent provision directly challenge Presidential reconstruction, it made the impossibility of achieving restoration in any state before the war a virtual certainty. Considering the trouble Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana had in establishing a government with only ten percent of the 1860 voters required, it is obvious that fifty percent would be unattainable during war time.

As if to modify the Radical effects of the first amendment, Davis announced another proposed change for the bill. Rather than exclude all civil and military officers from voting or running for office, Davis' second amendment reduced the number of those who would be ineligible. Davis proposed that only those holding positions above ministerial rank in civil government or Colonel in the military would be barred from participation in the restored state governments. Explaining the rationale for the amendment Davis declared that it "softens the operations of the clause excluding officers of the state and Confederate rebel governments, . . . so that the exclusion merely operates on persons of dangerous political influence."[8] This reduction, theoretically, made more men eligible to meet the stringent fifty percent requirement. This conciliatory gesture on Davis' part, however, was essentially meaningless. Those officers who would now be qualified to vote would not be able to subscribe to

the loyalty oath. Obviously, if they had held even a very low ranking civil or military position they would have violated the terms of the oath. Unable to take the oath, these low ranking former confederates would be excluded from participating in the loyal state government, thus illustrating the insignificance of the proposed amendment.

The proposed amendments met with no opposition and were easily adopted by voice vote shortly after their introduction. The new bill, with its amendments, was then approved by a vote of 73 to 59 on the same day, May 4. Following its passage in the House, the Davis bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Territories, chaired by Ohio Senator Benjamin F. Wade. After some delay, Wade introduced the bill into the Senate on May 27 but it was not until July 1, three days prior to the end of the first session, that the bill was considered.[9]

In introducing the bill to the Senate, Wade expressed many of the points Davis had used in the House. Declaring that the Presidential ten percent plan would result in undemocratic governments, the Ohio Senator emphatically stated that "the Executive ought not to be permitted to handle this great question to his own liking."[10] Following Wade's vehement defense of the bill, B. Gratz Brown, a Radical administration opponent from Missouri, proposed a substitute bill. This replacement would omit all of the specifics provided in the Davis bill and simply prohibit the states in rebellion from casting votes for Presidential electors or Congressional Representatives, until "the

insurrection was suppressed and the people had returned to their obedience."[11] The states would be declared loyal and allowed to participate in national elections only by a "later act of Congress."[12] Surprisingly, this brief, general substitute passed by the close vote of 17 to 16. With the session nearing its close and the humid Washington weather stifling, Senators became restless and disinterested in the topic. Many did not even attend the last few days of the session. Distressed, Wade sent the significantly altered bill back to the House for approval.[13]

On Saturday, July 2, the House considered the Senate version of the bill. With only one day left in the session, many Congressmen were tempted simply to agree with the Senate and work on a new, detailed bill in the next session. Davis, however, unwilling to let his bill die, persuaded the House to reject the Senate version. The same day, a conference committee was called. Wade, Davis and their committees met and it was decided that Wade would make an attempt to get the Senators to withdraw Brown's substitution. This tactic was successful, the withdrawal was made, and the Senate approved the House version of the bill by a vote of 18 to 14.[14]

Once the Wade-Davis bill had been successfully approved, it was submitted to President Lincoln on the last day of the session, July 4, for his signature. Lincoln, however, neither signed nor vetoed the bill, thus instituting a pocket veto. The Constitution states that if a bill is unsigned and Congress

adjourns so the bill can't be returned, it fails to become a law; the President does not have to issue a formal veto.[15] Because Lincoln had not criticized the Wade-Davis bill during its progress through Congress, the President's exercise of the pocket veto came as a surprise.

In an almost unheard of gesture, Lincoln issued a proclamation on July 8 which explained his reasons for not supporting the Wade-Davis bill. He was "unprepared by a formal approval of this Bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration."[16] Reluctant to approve the Congressional bill, Lincoln realized that the drastic differences between his plan and that of Wade and Davis would force Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee to start their reconstruction process over again. The Wade-Davis requirements of the iron-clad oath and the registration of a majority of the 1860 electorate would dissolve the governments in the three states. Lincoln did not want to risk "repelling and discouraging the local citizens"[17] who had first formed loyal state governments. While he had reservations, Lincoln claimed that he was "fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any state choosing to adopt it . . ."[18] Characteristically flexible, Lincoln expressed his willingness to implement the Wade-Davis program if the citizens of the southern states preferred that plan. This offer, however, was meaningless because he had just pocket-vetoed the plan and thus prevented it from becoming law. Perhaps Lincoln was simply

attempting to maintain party unity and demonstrate that he was not entirely opposed to the provisions in the Congressional reconstruction bill. With the Presidential election coming up in three months, Lincoln felt a need to explain his veto and express his willingness to be flexible.

The President's attempt to retain unity within his party, however, was not well received by many Republicans. "What an infamous proclamation!" Thaddeus Stevens fumed, "the idea of pocketing a bill and then issuing a proclamation as to how far he will conform to it, is matched only by signing a bill and then sending in a veto . . ."[19] Causing resentment rather than understanding, Lincoln's statement only served to fuel the already raging anger against him amongst Radical Republicans. Wade and Davis felt it necessary to express their rage publicly. On August 5, the two Congressmen published a manifesto in the New York Tribune. This manifesto was particularly vicious in its denunciation of the President. Rarely, if ever, had such strong language been directed at a member of the same party through such a public medium as a newspaper.

Hoping to cause Lincoln to withdraw from the Presidential race in the face of their mounting criticism, Wade and Davis did their best in the manifesto to demonstrate the faults of Lincoln's plan. Providing a detailed list of differences between their plan and that of the President, Wade and Davis pointed out the dangers of the unstable, undemocratic state governments which would develop under the Presidential plan. In addition to the

many flaws in Lincoln's restoration program, the authors asserted, Lincoln did not have the authority to direct the reconstruction process. Reiterating the Constitutional argument used in the bill, the authors deemed the President's attempt to direct reconstruction a use of "plenary dictatorial power." Under Lincoln's plan, Wade and Davis claimed, slavery could still exist. Only requiring adherence to the Emancipation Proclamation in his loyalty oath, Lincoln could allow slavery to continue in certain states. Wade and Davis worried that Lincoln's plan "does not secure the abolition of slavery, for the proclamation of freedom merely *pro*fessed to free certain slaves, while it recognizes the institution." Claiming that Lincoln's exclusion of certain states form the Emancipation Proclamation could lead to a revival of the institution, the Congressmen attempted to raise public indignation against the President.[20]

In the manifesto, Wade and Davis also expressed suspicion about the President's reasons and motivations for refusing to sign their bill. Lincoln's assertion that he did not want to discourage the progress made toward reconstruction in Tennessee, Louisiana and Arkansas, Wade and Davis felt, was unjustified because these states did not have true governments, "They are mere creatures of his will. They cannot live a day without his support. They are mere oligarchies imposed on the people by military orders . . ." In addition to calling the states Lincoln had retored "shadow governments," the Congressmen insisted that the veto was motivated by political aspirations. With the

Presidential election coming in November, Wade and Davis asserted, Lincoln would need every electoral vote he could get. If the restored states were allowed to participate in the election, they would surely cast their votes for Lincoln. The manifesto claimed that, "The President, by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the rebel states at the dictation of his personal ambition." Having severely criticized both Lincoln and his reconstruction programs, the authors warned that if the President wanted the support of Radical Republicans in the future he had better "leave political reorganization to the Congress."[21]

While many Republicans may have agreed with the individual points of the manifesto, most could not accept such scathing, public criticism of a member of their own party. In the conclusion of the document Wade and Davis wrote, "Such are the fruits of this rash and fatal act of the President, a blow at the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government."[22] Such an unrestrained indictment, rather than increasing the movement against Lincoln, drew supporters to his side. Faced with the open criticism present in the manifesto, Republicans felt the necessity to express their support for Lincoln.[23] Press reaction to the Wade-Davis manifesto was also negative. The Chicago Tribune called the statement "in very bad taste" and "hot-headed precipitancy."[24] No prominent papers, not even the New York Tribune that had first printed the manifesto expressed support for the statement.

The Radical attempt to discredit the President, then, failed. By harshly criticizing Lincoln, Wade and Davis had not eroded support for the President but, rather, had increased it. The Radical Republicans' failure to damage Lincoln's political reputation as well as encouraging developments in the war helped Lincoln to overcome his political opponents and win re-election in November 1864.

CHAPTER VI

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

While the Wade-Davis bill was being discussed in the Senate, Abraham Lincoln, in early June 1864, was chosen to be the Republican candidate for President. Earlier in the year, Lincoln's prospects for renomination had not appeared to be good. Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury in Lincoln's cabinet, had expressed his willingness to challenge Lincoln for the nomination. Chase later realized the lack of support for his candidacy and withdrew his name from consideration. Another Radical, John C. Fremont, was then the focus of Radical attention. Fremont had been the Republican party's first Presidential candidate in 1856 and he accepted the opportunity to run for executive office again. Earlier in the war, General Fremont had been involved with the President in a major dispute over the military's right to free slaves in the departments they commanded. Eager to promote Radical ideals and a harsh punishment for the South, Fremont entered the political ring. Other Congressional Radicals, however, were unwilling to endorse, at least publicly, either of these potential candidates. Fearing that open opposition of the President would damage their support at home, especially among soldiers who were staunchly committed to Lincoln, most Congressmen decided to wait until a more opportune time to publicly endorse a replacement for the President.[1]

With most prominent Republicans unwilling to oppose Lincoln's renomination publicly, the President had no trouble in obtaining his party's endorsement at the June convention. At the Baltimore meeting, the Radical faction of the party did not heartily endorse Lincoln nor did they criticize him. Their hope of a failed renomination gone, Radicals felt the only way to be relieved of Lincoln's policies was to force him to step down before the election. The attempt to discredit Lincoln and erode his base of support with the Wade-Davis bill, however, was a miserable failure and, in fact, caused the President's political position to improve. The final end to Radical hopes, however, came when General William T. Sherman captured Atlanta in early September 1864. The victory signaled a certain Union triumph. The encouraging war news bolstered Lincoln's public support and effectively ended Radical attempts to unseat the President.[2]

Now Lincoln only had to worry about his opponent from the Democratic Party, George B. McClellan. McClellan had, earlier in the war, been a very popular general, especially among his soldiers. Lincoln feared that he might lose the race and all of his work be lost in the summer of 1864, when McClellan's support seemed to be increasing. With the September victory in Atlanta, however, Lincoln's momentum picked up and he won the November election by a considerable margin. Carrying every Union state except Delaware, New Jersey and Kentucky, Lincoln had 234 electoral votes to McClellan's 21.[3]

Having succeeded in his re-elected bid, Lincoln was ready to move ahead with reconstruction. With the end of the war imminent, the President knew that some workable plan had to be established whether it be the original he had proposed and implemented in Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee or some variation of it. In his annual Message to Congress on December 6, he expressed his realization that, "The Executive power itself would be greatly diminished by the cessation of actual war."[4] Knowing he could no longer act under the provision of war powers, Lincoln acknowledged that Congress, in the future, must play a greater role in reconstruction. The President, however, was not willing to give completely up his part in the process. "Pardons would still be within Executive control," he reminded Congress. "In what spirit and temper this control would be executed can be fairly judged of by the past."[5] Warning Congress that in the next four years he was not going to allow Congress to control restoration exclusively, Lincoln announced his determination to keep the spirit of his plan intact.

Actually, the power struggle between the President and Congress seemed to be modifying in late 1864. A revised Wade-Davis bill had been introduced into the House which reflected a compromising spirit between Lincoln and the Radicals in Congress. The bill proposed Congressional recognition of the governments in Louisiana and Arkansas in return for Lincoln's acceptance of the Congressional plan for the other states. Although the bill was eventually tabled because some Radicals could not agree to

recognize Louisiana and Arkansas, the offer of compromise demonstrates a growing understanding between the President and the Radical faction of his party.

Further indication of Lincoln's future plans can be seen in a message he was prepared to send to Congress in early February 1865. On February 5, Lincoln showed the members of his cabinet a joint resolution which he planned to send to the national legislature. The resolution called for the appropriation of four hundred million dollars to be distributed among the states according to their pre-war slave population. Half of the state's allocation would be presented upon their surrender to Union forces, if they acted prior to April 1, 1865. The other half would be paid when the state ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery throughout the country, which had been approved by Congress in late January. This ratification, however, would have to be completed by July 1, 1865. Reasoning that the money spent on additional months of war would equal the amount he was requesting, Lincoln was sure that this resolution would result in a rapid end to the conflict. His cabinet, however, encouraged Lincoln not to submit the resolution at that time and Lincoln agreed. Nevertheless, the compensation program provided a hint of what Lincoln's future plans were. The President, apparently, realized the economic hardship both the war and the end to slavery would cause in the South. With his usual conciliatory attitude, Lincoln wanted to help the people of the South avoid further hardship.[6]

On March 4, 1865, Abraham Lincoln delivered his Second Inaugural Address. As he had in the February 5 cabinet meeting, Lincoln adopted a very forgiving, generous attitude toward the South and encouraged others to do the same. "With malice toward none; with charity for all," Lincoln declared, "let us strive on to finish the work we are in . . ." Wanting the country to forget past differences and reunite, Lincoln urged the people, "to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations." The tone of Lincoln's address indicates his desire for a lenient reconstruction plan, such as the one he had already developed, one which would reconcile southern states with the Union as quickly as possible.[7]

A final suggestion of Lincoln's future plans was included in an address he made to a group of serenaders on April 11, 1865. In the speech, Lincoln objected to the view that the seceding states had left the Union and must now undergo a rigorous process to be readmitted. Explaining that the question was not worth consideration, Lincoln told the serenaders, "Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad." With the war about to end, Lincoln realized that many members of Congress wished to implement a reconstruction plan of their own. Distressed that a new plan might destroy all the progress he had made in a state such as Louisiana, the President warned of the consequences of such an action. "Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and

disperse them." Wouldn't it be more useful, Lincoln asked, to keep the governments already established and modify them to meet new standards, rather than completely dissolving them? Desiring to bring about unity and peace as soon as possible, Lincoln did not want to lose the progress toward reconciliation which had already been made.[8]

While he did not want those states currently being reorganized according to his plan to be set back, the President expressed his willingness to be flexible. When he found the current plan to be "adverse to the public interest," Lincoln promised, a new program would be adopted. However, Lincoln stated, he had "not yet been so convinced." Although he was not ready to give up his plan, Lincoln realized that some changes might have to be made. Representatives from Louisiana, Tennessee and Arkansas were still denied admission to Congress; the states, therefore, were not yet fully restored. In this Last Public Address, Lincoln informed his audience that, "In the present 'situation' as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South." This new announcement, however, was never made, for three days later Lincoln was assassinated at Ford's Theater.[9]

Did Abraham Lincoln have a concrete, long term reconstruction plan? The President certainly had a number of principles such as flexibility, expediency and concilliation toward the South which he adhered to unwaveringly. As to the plan itself, Lincoln felt his was the best that he could devise

but, as he indicated a number of times, he was always willing to consider other methods. As events in the last year of his life suggest, Lincoln realized that changes in the reconstruction program needed to be made. But, while he was willing to make modifications, Lincoln had indicated throughout his Presidency that he would not be willing to abandon the basic theory toward reconstruction he had established in order to make those changes. No one knows exactly what course Lincoln might have taken in the troubled post war years that lay ahead. One thing is certain, however, Lincoln would not have allowed his principles to be compromised.

ENDNOTES

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[1]Roy P. Basler, ed. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953), Vol. 4, p. 265.

[2]Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 430.

[3]Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 264.

[4]Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 266.

[5]Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 432.

[6]Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 437.

[7]Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 15.

[8]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 3, p. 547.

[9]Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 531.

[10]Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., Session 1, p. 223.

[11]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 388.

[12]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 52.

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[1]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 49.

[2]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 126-130.

[3]Charles Sumner quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 131.

[4]Henry Winter Davis quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 134.

[5]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 131-141.

[6]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 49.

[7]U.S. Statutes At Large XII, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 159.

[8]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 169.

[9]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 59.

[10]Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 151.

[11]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 52.

[12]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 52.

[13]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 54.

[14]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 51.

[15]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 55.

[16]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 56.

[17]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 155-167.

[18]Ibid., pp. 155-167.

[19]New York Tribune, December 10, 1863, quoted in James G. Randall and Richard N. Current, Lincoln The President: Last Full Measure (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1955), p. 7.

[20]Richard H. Abbott, The Republican Party and the South (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), p. 32.

CHAPTER III

[1]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol, 5, p. 504.

[2]Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 364.

[3]Randall and Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure, p. 12.

[4]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 143-152; Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 6, p. 288.

[5]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 110-121.

[6]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 1.

[7]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 89.

[8]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 124.

[9]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 190-197.

[10]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 3, p. 123.

[11]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 192.

[12]Ibid., pp. 190-197.

[13]William C. Harris, "Lincoln and Wartime Reconstruction in North Carolina," The North Carolina Historical Review (April 1986): p. 154.

[14]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 6, p. 440.

[15]Randall and Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure, pp. 20-22.

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[17]William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plans of Reconstruction (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), p. 57; James W. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction Tennessee 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press), p. 30.

[18]Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee 1860-1869, pp. 26-51.

[19]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 6, p. 440.

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[21]Thomas S. Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas 1862-1874, pp. 9-23.

[22]Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas 1862-1874, p. 9-23; Randall and Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure, p. 23.

[23]Thomas S. Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas 1862-1874, pp. 9-23.

[24]Ibid., p. 21.

[25]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 108.

[26]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 221.

[27]Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas 1862-1874, p. 31.

[28]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 253.

[29]Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 318.

[30]Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas 1862-1874, p. 35; Randall and Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure, p. 23.

[31]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 7, p. 418; Randall and Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure, p. 24.

CHAPTER IV

[1]Springfield, Massachusetts Weekly Republican, January 2, 1864 quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 169.

[2]Philadelphia Press, December 11, 1863 quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 196.

[3]Tyler Dennett, ed. Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1939), pp. 131-132.

[4]38 Cong., H.R. 48, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 178.

[5]38 Cong., H.R. 48, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 181.

[6]38 Cong., H.R. 48, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 181.

[7]38 Cong., H.R. 48, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 183.

[8]Ibid., pp. 180-184.

[9]Cincinnati Gazette, December 25, 1983, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 188.

[10]William Pitt Fessenden, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 189.

[11]Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., Session 1, p. 412.

[12]38 Cong., H.R. 118, quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 194.

[13]Cong. Globe, 38 Congress, Session 1, p. 5, 523.

[14]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 117.

[15]Ibid., pp. 115-120.

CHAPTER V

[1]Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., Session 1, appendix, p. 83.

[2]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 198-243.

[3]Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., Session 1, appendix, p. 83.

[4]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 102.

[5]Ibid., p. 201.

[6]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 198-243; Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plans of Reconstruction, pp. 95-120.

[7]Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., Session 1, appendix, p. 83.

[8]Ibid., p. 2107.

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[10]Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., Session 1, p. 3448.

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[15]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 224.

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[19]Thaddeus Stevens quoted in Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, p. 227.

[20]New York Tribune, August 5, 1864.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy During the Civil War, pp. 198-243.

[24]Chicago Tribune, August 9, 1864, quoted in Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction, p. 20.

CHAPTER VI

[1]T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941), pp. 306-333.

[2]Ibid., pp. 306-333.

[3]Randall and Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure, pp. 233-264.

[4]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 8, p. 152.

[5]Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 152.

[6]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 8, p. 260, 261; Randall and Current, Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure, p. 339.

[7]Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 8, p. 333.

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